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RECENT DECISIONS
and must be paid regardless of whether the federal taxes have been
paid. 17
H.K.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
NEGLIGENCE.--Defendant entered into an agreement with a contract-
ing firm whereby the latter was to do its construction work and fur-
nish all necessary labor. However, defendant was to have the right
of general supervision. The purpose of this arrangement was to evade
the payment of premiums on accident insurance. Deceased was for-
merly employed by the defendant, but under the agreement he was
discharged by the defendant and hired by the construction firm. He
was killed because of the negligence of the defendant and the admin-
istratrix brings this action under Section 130 of the Decedent Estate
Law. The defense is (1) that although deceased was hired by the
construction firm, the defendant retained general supervision over all
the work and the employees, and hence deceased was in the employ
of defendant; (2) that the contract between defendant and the con-
struction firm did not express the real intent of the parties; and (3)
that since in fact deceased was in the employ of defendant, the sole
remedy is under the Workmen's Compensation Law.' On appeal
from a reversal by the Appellate Division of a judgment for the plain-
tiff, held, reversed and new trial granted. The action was properly
brought in negligence. The reversal by the Appellate Division on the
ground that there was a master and servant relationship was against
the weight of evidence; but because of apparently inconsistent findings
of fact by the jury, a new trial should be held. Wawrzonek v. Central
Hudson Gas and Electric Corp., 276 N. Y. 412, 12 N. E. (2d) 527
(1938).
Prior to the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Law in
1922, the common law rule of master and. servant was the basis of
11 ,* * * by the Constitution the States not only gave to the nation the
concurrent power to taxc persons and property directly, but * * *." Fuller, C. J.,
in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (1895).
In Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 109, 53 Sup. Ct. 534 (1933), in com-
menting upon the possible hardship to individuals subject to both federal and
state taxes, the court said, "If the legislation hereunder review results in
imposing an unfair burden upon the taxpayer, the remedy is with Congress and
not with the courts. Unless there is a violation of the Constitution, Congress
may select the subjects of taxation * * *"
' N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 11: "The liability of an
employer * * * shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability * * *."
Shanahan v. Monarch Engineering Co., 219 N. Y. 469, 114 N. E. 795 (1916)
(right to compensation is exclusive remedy where master and servant relation-
ship exists); Lee v. Cranford, Inc., 182 App. Div. 191, 169 N. Y. Supp. 370
(2d Dept. 1918).
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all liability.2  The servant could recover for the master's negligence
providing there was no assumption of the risk and no contributory
negligence. But under the Act, these defenses cannot be availed of
by the employer.3 The Act also provides that the liability of the
employer for compensation is exclusive of all other liability.4  Prior
to the amendment of Section 29 in 1937, the injured employee had
the right to elect to sue the third party causing the injury in tort. He
could not avail himself of both remedies. If he filed a notice of such
election, the right of compensation was still available to him in the
event of a recovery which was less than compensation. As amended,5
Section 29 gives the double remedy to the employee, with the pro-
viso that the employer or State Insurance Fund shall have a lien on
the proceeds to the amount of the compensation award. If the em-
ployee fails to bring the negligence action, the carrier may do so, but
in this event the employee will be entitled to only two-thirds of the
balance remaining after the carrier's claim is deducted.
In the instant case the main point in issue was whether there
existed a master and servant relationship between the deceased and
the defendant. If such relationship existed, then the defendant can
be held only to compensation under the Act.0 Even though the words
"Independent Contractor" were stricken out of the agreement, and
even though the defendant had the right of general supervision, there
existed the relationship of independent contractor. 7 The common law
definition of an independent contractor as stated in Hexamer v. Webb 8
has been adopted in compensation cases.9 In the light of the above
a general employment cannot properly be found to exist. Defendant's
contention that there existed a special employment must likewise fail.
'EDGAR AND EDGAR, LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1936) 86, 87.
'N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 10: "Every employer * * *
shall * * * secure compensation for * * * injury arising out of and in the course
of employment without regard to fault as a cause of injury * *
' See note 1, supra.
'Laws of 1937, c. 684.
'Schweitzer v. Thompson Norris Co. of N. J., 229 N. Y. 97, 127 N. E. 904
(1920).
'Medford Lumber Co. v. Mahner, 197 Wis. 35, 221 N. W. 390 (1928)(reserved right of supervision and direction, did not create a master and servant
relation so long as the supervision was to ultimate result and not details).
Accord: Matter of Litts v. Risley Lumber Co., 224 N. Y. 321, 120 N. E. 730
(1918) (direction of details did not make master and servant relation where
the directions were given to secure fulfillment of the contract and did not
deprive the painter of means of painting as he wished) ; Slyter v. Clinton Con-
struction Co., 107 Cal. App. 348, 290 Pac. 643 (1930) ; Long v. Eastern Paving
Co., 295 Pa. 163, 145 Atl. 71 (1929); Lichtenwager v. Silverman, 243 App.
Div. 127, 254 N. Y. Supp. 392 (3d Dept. 1931).
8 101 N. Y. 377, 383, 4 N. E. 755, 756 (1886).
'Beach v. Velzy, 238 N. Y. 100, 103, 143 N. E. 805, 806 (1924): "An
independent contractor is one who agrees to do a specific piece of work for
another for a lump sum * * *, who has control of himself and his helpers as
to when, * * * he shall begin and finish the work; as to method * * * of
accomplishing it; and who is not subject to discharge because he does the work
in one way rather than another."
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A general employee of one does not become a special employee of
another unless there is a complete surrender of control 10 and in the
absence of such complete surrender, the control of the general em-
ployer continued."1 The division of control will not in and of itself
raise a presumption of surrender. 12 The court also was influenced
by the fact that the purpose of the agreement was to avoid the pay-
ment of premiums, and held that it did not lie in the mouth of the
defendant to deny that the agreement set up an independent con-
tractor relation.
S. C. S.
"'Ramsey v. N. Y. C. R. R., 269 N. Y. 219, 199 N. E. 65 (1935) (in
absence of evidence of direction and control a train operator did not become a
special employee).
'Bartolomeo v. Bennett 'Contr. Co., 245 N. Y. 66, 156 N. E. 98 (1927);
Irwin v. Klein, 271 N. Y. 477, 3 N. E. (2d) 601 (1936).
' Charles v. Barrett, 233 N. Y. 127, 135 N. E. 199 (1922).
Instant case at 420; Shuba v. Greendonner, 271 N. Y. 189, 193, 2 N. E.
(2d) 536 (1936) (where a motor vehicle is registered, one cannot deny
ownership. "Whether we call it estoppel or not makes no difference in the
final result."); City of Buffalo v. Balcon, 134 N. Y. 532, 32 N. E. 7 (1892)
(parties cannot accept benefits under a contract fairly made and at the same
time question its validity). But cf. People v. Kaplan, 160 Misc. 179, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 474 (1936) (the formation of a partnership was held valid even though
it was for the express purpose of evading the payment of compensation
premium).
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